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Digital or Trade? 
The Contrasting Approaches of China and US to Digital Trade 
By Henry Gao 
(forthcoming in Journal of International Economic Law) 
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Abstract:  
With the growing importance of the internet, digital trade, or electronic commerce, has 
become a key issue in international trade regulation. As the home to some of the largest internet 
companies in the world, the United States took the lead in bringing the issue into the WTO and 
has been the leading proponent on the issue. In contrast, the developing countries were quite 
sceptical and reluctant to engage on discussions on the issue. Recently, however, several 
developing countries has changed their positions and become more active participants. Chief 
among them is China, which has raised some interesting proposals both within and beyond the 
WTO. The issue has also been identified as one of the main issues to be discussed at the 11th 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO. This paper provides a critical examination of the 
contrasting approaches of the US and China on the issue. It argues that, the US approach tends 
to focus more on the “digital” nature of digital trade, while the Chinese approach prefers to 
address the issue from the traditional “trade” perspective. The paper analyses the reasons for 
the different approaches, and provides some suggestions on how to move forward on the issue at 
MC11 and beyond given the differences between the two approaches.  
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With the conclusion of the Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017, 
the WTO has entered a new era. Due to the lack of consensus by the WTO Membership, most 
items in the original agenda of the Doha Round have been quietly abandoned. Only a handful of 
issues in the DDA remains alive. Among them, the hottest issue is digital trade, also known as 
electronic commerce (e-commerce). It not only found its way into both a Ministerial Decision1 
and a Joint Ministerial Statement2, but also became the subject of a joint initiative by the WTO, 
the World Economic Forum and the Electronic World Trade Platform (eWTP)3, the first of its 
kind in the WTO. With these promising signs, e-commerce probably will become one of the first 
Doha issues to bear fruit. However, before that happens, we need to first understand the 
contrasting approaches to e-commerce regulation in trade agreements by the two biggest players, 
i.e., the US and China, as they are the ones with the most potential to decide what the future rules 
on e-commerce will look like. While there have been some recent works on the US approach4, 
there have been no such analysis on the Chinese approach, let alone a comparison of the two. 
This article fills this important research gap with a systemic and thorough analysis of the 
different approaches taken by the two WTO Members. It starts by reviewing the regulation of 
e-commerce or digital trade issues under the WTO, then discusses the major initiatives by the US 
and China in various fora, including the plurilateral trade agreements such as the Trade in 
Services Agreement, Regional Trade Agreements, and the WTO. After canvassing the 
differences, the article argues that, the US approach tends to focus more on the “digital” nature 
of digital trade, while the Chinese approach prefers to address the issue from the traditional 
“trade” perspective. The article analyses the reasons for the different approaches, and provides 
                                                          
1 WTO, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce: Ministerial Decision of 13 December 2017, Ministerial 
Conference, Eleventh Session, Buenos Aires, 10-13 December 2017, WT/MIN(17)/65, WT/L/1032, 18 December 
2017.  
2 WTO, Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, Ministerial Conference, Eleventh Session, Buenos Aires, 10-13 
December 2017, WT/MIN(17)/60, 13 December 2017.  
3 WTO, ‘WTO, World Economic Forum and eWTP launch joint public-private dialogue to open up e-commerce for 
small business’, 13 December 2017, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/ecom_11dec17_e.htm.  
4 See e.g., Mark Wu, 2017, Digital Trade-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Existing Models and 
Lessons for the Multilateral Trade System. RTA Exchange. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ICTSD) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). www.rtaexchange.org; Rachel F. Fefer, 
Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Wayne M. Morrison, Digital Trade and U.S. Trade Policy, CRS Report for Congress, R44565, 
June 6, 2017, available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44565.pdf.  
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some suggestions on how to move forward on the issue given the differences between the two 
approaches. 
 
I. The Regulation of Digital Trade under the WTO 
 
The first attempt to regulate e-commerce in the WTO was made at the 2nd Ministerial 
Conference in May 1998, when the Members adopted the Declaration on Global Electronic 
Commerce.5 The Declaration recognized the “new opportunities for trade”, and directed the 
General Council to “establish a comprehensive work programme to examine all trade-related 
issues relating to global electronic commerce, including those issues identified by Members.”6  
 
In the Declaration, the Members also agreed to “continue their current practice of not 
imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions”.7 This moratorium on customs cuties has 
been extended several times, with the most recent one in Nairobi until 2017.8   
 
At the same time, the moratorium also left a few questions unanswered. First of all, it is 
unclear as to whether the term “electronic transmissions” refers only to the medium of 
e-commerce, or to the content of the transmission as well, i.e., the underlying product or service 
being transmitted.9 Second, if it refers to the medium of transmission only, does this mean that 
other digital products which are supplied via traditional medium, such as books, music or videos 
on CDs could be subject to customs duties? Third, does the prohibition applies only to customs 
duties, or to other fees or charges imposed on the digital products? Fourth, does the moratorium 
applies only to imports, or to exports as well? 
                                                          
5 WTO, Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce, adopted on 20 May 1998 at the Second WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Geneva, WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2, 25 May 1998.  
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 WTO, Ministerial Decision on Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, adopted on 19 December 2015 at the 
Tenth WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi, WT/MIN(15)/42 — WT/L/977, 21 December 2015.  
9 See e.g., Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The WTO, the Internet and Trade in Digital Products: EC-US Perspectives, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006; Sacha Wunsch-Vincent & Arno Hold, Towards Coherent Rules for Digital Trade: 
Building on Efforts in Multilateral versus Preferential Trade Negotiations, in Mira Burri and Thomas Cottier (eds.), 
Trade Governance in the Digital Age: World Trade Forum, Cambridge University Press, 2012, at p. 182. 
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Pursuant to the Declaration, the General Council adopted the Work Programme on 
Electronic Commerce in September 1998.10 Under the Work Program, "electronic commerce" is 
broadly defined to cover “the production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and 
services by electronic means”.11 Moreover, the Work Program also includes under its scope 
“issues relating to the development of the infrastructure for electronic commerce.”  
 
As e-commerce cuts across many different areas, the Work Program divides up the work 
among several WTO bodies such as the Council for Trade in Services, the Council for Trade in 
Goods, the Council for TRIPS, and the Committee on Trade and Development, which shall deal 
with issues under their jurisdiction, i.e., services, goods, intellectual property rights and 
development related issues respectively.12  
 
These bodies shall report their progress to the General Council on a regular basis.13 In 
addition, the General Council is also responsible for the review of any cross-cutting trade-related 
and all aspects of the work programme concerning the imposition of customs duties on electronic 
transmission.14 In carrying out its work, these bodies shall also take into account the work of 
other intergovernmental organizations as well as relevant non-governmental organizations.15  
 
Since then, the Members have conducted many discussions on e-commerce in the various 
bodies. However, due to the slow progress in the DDA in general, the Members have not been 
able to reach any decision on the substantive disciplines on e-commerce notwithstanding the 
ambitious agenda foreseen in the Work Program. 16 
                                                          
10 WTO, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, adopted by the General Council on 25 September 1998, 
WT/L/274, 30 September 1998.  
11 Id., para. 1.3.  
12 Id., para. 5.1. 
13 Id., para. 1.2. 
14 Id.  
15 Id., para. 1.4. 
16 WTO: Work Programme on Electronic Commerce: Dedicated Discussion on Electronic Commerce Under the 
Auspices of the General Council, Report to the 21 November 2013 meeting of the General Council, WT/GC/W/676, 
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On 7 December 2016, the Chairman of the General Council reported on the latest 
progress on the Work Programme.17 In the report, the Chairman noted that the potential benefits 
of e-commerce is widely recognized among the WTO Membership.18 While there are some 
resistance on starting substantive discussion of e-commerce,19 some Members wish to go 
beyond the exploratory nature of the current Work Program and see some progress by MC11.20 
The Chairman suggested that Members “should identify issues that can be discussed in the WTO 
and proceed incrementally in a transparent and inclusive manner”.21  
 
With such renewed interests on e-commerce, it is worth exploring the positions taken by 
the two of the most important WTO Members, i.e., the US and China. The following sections 
will compare their respective approaches, discuss the reasons for the differences, and try to 
explore the best way to move the issue forward in the WTO.   
 
II. The US Approach 
 
Due to the slow progress in the WTO, the US has been pursuing the issue simultaneously 
in several fora. The first is in its bilateral and regional Free Trade Agreements, which generally 
follow the US template and include e-commerce as one of the key elements. Also, since 2013, 
e-commerce has been featured prominently in the pluri-lateral Trade in Services Agreement 
(TISA) that the US led along with the EU and a group of “like-minded” countries. Finally, since 
2016, the US has also been active in pushing for the inclusion of e-commerce in the negotiating 
agenda of the WTO. This section reviews these initiatives in detail.  
 
A. TISA 
 
Under Art. XIX of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), WTO Members 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 November 2013.  
17 WTO General Council, Item 6 – Work Programme on Electronic Commerce – Review of Progress: Report by the 
Chairman, WT/GC/W/728, 8 December 2016. 
18 Id., para. 1.11. 
19 Id., para. 1.8. 
20 Id., para. 1.13. 
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are supposed to start a new round of negotiations “beginning not later than five years” from the 
date the WTO was established. In 2000, a new round of negotiation was launched pursuant to 
this built-in agenda. At the Doha Ministerial Conference in Nov 2001, the GATS negotiations 
were merged into the newly-launched Doha Round as part of the “single undertaking”.22 
However, due to a series of setbacks, the GATS negotiations ran into impasse along with other 
parts of the DDA. In view of the difficulties, the 8th Ministerial Conference agreed to allow 
Members to “more fully explore different negotiating approaches” that “allow Members to reach 
provisional or definitive agreements based on consensus earlier than the full conclusion of the 
single undertaking”.23  
 
The idea for a stand-alone services agreement was taken up by a group of the most 
enthusiastic participants in the GATS negotiations, which is known as Really Good Friends of 
Services (RGFs).24 Led by the US and Australia, the group of 16 WTO Members reached an 
agreement in 2012 to start negotiations on a new services agreement known as the Trade in 
Services Agreement.25 In March 2013, the negotiations were formally launched.26 Since then, 
21 rounds of negotiations have been held27 and the membership has expanded to 23 WTO 
Members,28 which are mainly to be developed countries and high-income developing countries 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
21 Id., at para. 1.14. 
22 WTO, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, 9 - 14 November 2001, Ministerial Declaration adopted on 
14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, at paras. 15, 47. 
23 See WTO, Ministerial Conference, Eighth Session, Geneva, 15 - 17 December 2011, Elements for Political 
Guidance, WT/MIN(11)/W/2, 1 December 2011, at p.3. 
24 Pierre Sauve, A Plurilateral Agenda for Services? Assessing the case for a Trade in Services Agreement, in Pierre 
Sauve & Anirudh Shingal (eds.), The Preferential Liberalization of Trade in Services: Comparative Regionalism, 
Edward Elgar, 2014, at p. 413.  
25 See Laine Škoba, Opening negotiations on a plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), Library Briefing: 
Library of the European Parliament, 27 July 2013, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/eplibrary/Opening-negotiations-on-a-plurilateral-Trade-in-Services-Agreement-TiSA
-FINAL.pdf. See also Elina Viilup, The Trade in Services Agreement (TISA): An end to negotiations in sight?, 
European Parliament, Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/570448/EXPO_IDA(2015)570448_EN.pdf, at p. 11.  
26 Ecorys, Trade SIA in support of negotiations on a plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA): Draft Final 
Report, at p.10, available at trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/155510.htm. See also Elina Viilup, supra note 25, at p. 
12.     
27 European Commission, Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA),  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/. 
28 The current members are Australia, Canada, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, the EU, Hong Kong 
China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
CN-US-EC 
7 
with a liberal bent. Together, they account for 70% of world trade in services.29  
 
As it stands, the TISA is expected to include four parts that largely mirror the structure of 
the GATS, which would make it easier to multilateralize the agreement later on. Part I consists of 
definitions and general principles, similar to Parts I and II of the GATS.30 Part II lays down the 
specific commitments on market access and national treatment as in GATS Part III.31 Unlike the 
positive listing approach adopted by the GATS, however, the TISA is said to adopt a “hybrid 
approach”, whereby market access commitments follow the positive listing approach, while the 
national treatment commitments follow the negative listing approach. 32  Part III includes 
thematic or regulatory annexes which address either cross-cutting systematic issues such as 
domestic regulation or transparency; or sector-specific chapters on e-commerce, financial 
services, or professional services.33 Part IV deals with the institutional provisions such as 
organizational setup and dispute settlement. It is worth noting that the TISA will only include a 
state-to-state dispute settlement system, instead of the investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism that has become popular in recent investment and trade agreements.34   
 
As the main driving force behind the TISA, the US submitted proposals in all chapters, 
including e-commerce. The US e-commerce proposals can be divided into two categories: First, 
provisions applicable to the e-commerce sector only; second, general obligations applicable to all 
services but are especially relevant to e-commerce due to its special nature.   
 
a. E-commerce Specific Provisions 
1. Free Movement of Information, which provides service suppliers with the freedom to 
transfer information across countries in the conduct of its business. It is worth noting 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Peru, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. 
29 European Commission, TISA Factsheet, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/september/tradoc_154971.doc.pdf.  
30 See Elina Viilup, supra note 25, at p.17. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id., at p.18.  
34 Id. 
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that such information includes not only commercial information, but also personal 
information of the users of such e-commerce business.35 However, the US does not 
intend to apply the provision to financial services, as US financial regulators such as 
the Treasury and the Securities and Exchange Commission wish to retain the ability 
to “to seize data and resources quickly to address abuse or to contain a financial 
crisis.”36  
 
2. Open networks. This provision provides consumers with two freedoms. First, the 
freedom to access and use services and applications of their choice online; and second, 
the freedom to connect their choice of devices.37 The clause also provides consumers 
with access to information on network management practices of their Internet access 
service suppliers (ISPs).38 The only restrictions that might be imposed are reasonable 
network management practices, as well as those designed to prevent harm to the 
network.39 This provision is mainly designed to provide consumers with freedom of 
choice in both software and hardware, as opposed to the anti-competitive practices of 
mandating the use of certain services or devices. It is unclear whether the word 
“consumers” here refer only to pure consumers or those commercial consumers 
which are also providers of e-commerce, but judging from the expansive approach 
advocated by the US, it is not unreasonable to assume that both groups should be 
eligible to claim the benefits under the clause.  
 
3. Local infrastructure. This provision prevents countries from requiring service 
suppliers to store or process data in the territory of the host country as a condition of 
                                                          
35 WikiLeaks, Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA): Annex on Electronic Commerce, WikiLeaks release: June 3, 
2015, at p. 2. 
36 See Anna Gelpern, ‘Financial Services’ in Peterson Institute for International Economics, Assessing the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, PIIE Briefing 16-1, February 2016, 99. See also, Rachel Fefer, ‘Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations: Overview and Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service, 3 January 
2017, pp. 12-13; Jan Kelsey, TiSA – Foul Play, Uni Global Union, 2017, at pp. 69-70, available at 
http://www.uniglobalunion.org/news/tisa-foul-play.  
37 WikiLeaks, supra note 35, at p. 6.  
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
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supplying a service or investing.40 These include both requirements to use computing 
facilities located in such territory and requirements to computer processing and 
storage services located in such territory.41 Again there is a special carve-out for 
financial services, as the US wishes to limit the application of the provision to only 
those financial services covered by a member’s specific commitments.42  
 
4. Electronic Authentication and Electronic Signatures. This provision aims to 
encourage the adoption of Electronic Authentication and Electronic Signatures by 
prohibiting the discrimination against such methods.43 Instead, the parties are granted 
significant autonomy in adopting the methods of their choice and this could greatly 
facilitate e-commerce.  
 
b. Horizontal Provisions  
The horizontal provisions apply to all services. Due to the special nature of e-commerce, 
some provisions are particularly relevant to the sector. These include many provisions already 
found in the e-commerce chapter, such as provisions on movement of information, open 
networks, network access and use, and electronic authentication and electronic signature. The 
remaining provisions mainly deal with localization requirements. As we mentioned earlier, the 
e-commerce chapter addressed one aspect of the issue, i.e., local infrastructure. In the horizontal 
section, however, the obligation spans wider into three areas. The first is the prohibition of local 
commercial presence or residency in the host country unless such requirement is spelt out in the 
schedule.44 While such local presence requirements could potentially affect all service sectors, 
e-commerce is especially vulnerable as it is often detached from traditional brick-and-mortar 
establishments.   
 
                                                          
40 Id., at p. 7.  
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id., at p. 9.  
44 Id., at p. 16.  
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The second is the prohibition of local content requirements.45 Depending on the modus 
operandi of the local content requirements, this obligation can be further divided into two 
categories. One is granting preferences or advantages to goods or electronically transmitted 
contents produced in a territory, or, as mentioned earlier in the e-commerce chapter, to local 
computing facilities or computer processing or storage services supplied locally.46 The other is 
requiring foreign service suppliers to purchase or use local goods or electronically transmitted 
contents.47 In a way, this provision may be regarded as a further-refined national treatment 
obligation.  
 
The third is the prohibition of local technology requirements.48 This also can be broken 
down into two types of obligations. One addresses the issue of forced technology transfer and 
prohibits members from requiring service suppliers to transfer technologies as a condition of 
providing a service.49 The other deals with rules which either require or prevent such service 
suppliers to purchase or use certain technologies.50 Combined together, the two provide service 
suppliers total freedom in choosing the technologies they might use in providing its services.  
 
B. Free Trade Agreements 
 
The first US FTA to address e-commerce issues is the one with Jordan, which went into 
effect in 2010. It only includes one article, which sets out three prohibitions on various 
restrictions on e-commerce, i.e., customs duties on electronic transmissions; unnecessary barriers 
                                                          
45 Id., at p. 17.  
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id., at p. 18.  
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
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on electronic transmissions; and impeding the supply of services through electronic means.51 In 
a way, this approach reflected the reality of the e-commerce market in the early stage of 
development, where there were few government regulations in the sector and all that is needed is 
for the regulators to leave the e-commerce businesses on their own.  
 
With the rapid development of the sector, however, the passive laissez-faire approach 
increasingly became insufficient. Thus, later US FTAs started to include more comprehensive 
rules on e-commerce. This is reflected in two aspects. First, in terms of the structure, 
e-commerce is elevated from a few articles into an entire chapter. Second, in terms of the 
substance, the e-commerce disciplines also expand from passive non-interference obligations 
into more positive requirements that spell out what the governments needs to do for e-commerce 
businesses. This new model of e-commerce obligations started out in the 2004 FTAs the US 
signed with Australia, Chile and Singapore respectively, and culminated in the TPP that was 
concluded in 2016. While the Trump Administration has withdrawn from the TPP, the 
e-commerce chapter was heavily influenced by the US and has been incorporated into the new 
CPTPP that the remaining 11 TPP-members agreed to in Nov 2017. In all likelihood, it is 
reasonable to expect that similar provisions will be reflected in future US FTAs. Therefore, we 
will use the TPP to discuss the US e-commerce provisions in its FTAs.  
 
The TPP e-commerce provisions are guided by the U.S. objectives in the TPP, as 
announced by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in June 2014. It includes the 
following key components:52 
“- commitments not to impose customs duties on digital products (e.g., software, music, 
video, e-books); 
                                                          
51 Agreement between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of 
a Free Trade Area, 24 Oct, 2000, Art. 7, available at 
https://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/UnitedStates-Jordan.pdf.  
52 United States Trade Representative, ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives’, available at 
https://ustr.gov/tpp/Summary-of-US-objectives.  
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- non-discriminatory treatment of digital products transmitted electronically and 
guarantees that these products will not face government-sanctioned discrimination based on the 
nationality or territory in which the product is produced; 
- requirements that support a single, global Internet, including ensuring cross-border 
data flows, consistent with governments’ legitimate interest in regulating for purposes of privacy 
protection; 
- rules against localization requirements that force businesses to place computer 
infrastructure in each market in which they seek to operate;  
- commitments to provide reasonable network access for telecommunications suppliers 
through interconnection and access to physical facilities”. 
These objectives have largely been fulfilled in the final TPP agreement. Depending on 
the nature of the specific obligations, we can divide them into the following three categories: 
 
The first are the passive obligations, which prohibits the members from adopting various 
protectionist policies. The list of prohibited measures includes customs duties on electronic 
transmission;53 discriminations against foreign digital products;54 restrictions on cross-border 
transfer of information; forced localization requirements; and forced transfer of source codes.55 
The provisions are designed to minimize the distortions created by government interventions and 
leave the development of the e-commerce market in the hands of the e-commerce players. 
 
At the same time, the TPP also recognizes that, as e-commerce is a new mode of doing 
business, the existing regulatory framework might be ill-prepared for the development of the 
sector. Thus, the TPP also includes provisions which require member governments to introduce 
or maintain regulatory frameworks which facilitate the development of e-commerce. For 
example, under Art. 14.5, members are required to maintain a legal framework governing 
electronic transactions consistent with the principles of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce 1996 or the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic 
                                                          
53 TPP, Art. 14.3. 
54 Id., Art. 14.4. 
55 Id., Art. 14.17. 
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Communications in International Contracts. Similarly, Art. 14.6 require the recognition of the 
legal validity of electronic signatures or electronic authentication methods, while Art. 14.9 
provides for the acceptance of electronic documents as the legal equivalent of their paper 
versions. These provisions all deal with one key issue facing the e-commerce sector, i.e., the 
recognition of e-commerce transactions as equivalents of the formalities designed for the 
pre-internet age.   
 
Taken together, these provisions largely reflect the laissez-faire regulatory philosophy 
prevalent in the e-commerce regulatory framework in the US, which indeed was beneficial to the 
development of e-commerce in its infancy stage. With the rapid growth of the sector, however, 
many e-commerce giants have now acquired so much market power that, if left totally 
unchecked, could lead to dire consequences. In particular, there are two potential risks. The first 
comes from those market players which own or control key infrastructures, which could include 
either hardware infrastructure such as telecommunication or internet networks, or key software 
infrastructure such as operating systems, search portals, content sharing platforms, etc. These 
firms could abuse their power by unreasonably denying access to their infrastructures to their 
business users, making it impossible for these users to conduct e-commerce activities. This 
problem is mainly addressed in Art. 14.10, which provides consumers with the freedom of access 
to and use of the internet for e-commerce, subject only to network management and network 
safety restrictions. It is worth noting that “consumers” here include not only individual 
consumers, but also business consumers, as the provision specifies that the internet is used for 
electronic commerce. The second type of risks come from those e-commerce businesses which 
generate, store or process the personal information of individual consumers, whereby such 
information could be sold, misused, or leaked. To deal with these risks, the TPP includes 
provisions on online consumer protection, personal information protection, and unsolicited 
commercial electronic messages.       
 
C. WTO 
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In early 2016, e-commerce gained “renewed interests” among WTO Members.56 In July 
of the same year, seven proposals were tabled by major WTO Members such as the US, EU, 
Japan and Brazil.57 The US proposal seems to be encouraged by its success in the TISA and TPP 
negotiations, and is discussed in detail here. 
 
At the outset, it is interesting to note that the US takes a rather cautious approach to the 
issue, probably in anticipation of the strong resistance from developing countries, especially the 
African Group.58 Thus, they repeatedly emphasized that they have “no preconceived views on 
best approaches, or on whether negotiations on specific aspects of e-commerce should be 
pursued, and if so on what bases.”59 Instead, their submission is only a “non-paper” that is 
“intended solely to contribute to constructive discussion among Members” rather than to advance 
“specific negotiating proposals”.60 However, as there are a lot of similarities between the US 
submission and its proposals in the TISA and TPP, it is reasonable to assume that the non-paper 
actually does reflect the US negotiating positions.  
 
The US submission includes a total of sixteen “examples of positive contributions to a 
flourishing digital economy”.61 Like their proposals in the TISA and TPP, many of these 
examples aim at the dismantling of both cross-border and domestic barriers to digital trade, such 
as the ban on customs duties,62 non-discrimination,63 removing restrictions on cross-border data 
flow,64 and bans on government regulations requiring localization 65  or forced transfer of 
                                                          
56 WTO General Council, ‘Item 4 – Work Program on Electronic Commerce – Review of Progress: Report by 
Ambassador Alfredo Suescum – Friend of the Chair’, WT/GC/W/721, 1 August 2016. 
57 See e.g., JOB/GC/94 (US); JOB/GC/96 (Japan et al); JOB/GC/97 (EU et al); JOB/GC/98 (Brazil); JOB/GC/99 
(MIKTA countries); JOB/GC/100 (Japan); JOB/GC/101/Rev.1 (Singapore et al). 
58 See Kanaga Raja, ‘The African Group position on e-commerce talks at WTO’, in South North Development 
Monitor, #8559, 24 October 2017, available at https://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2017/ti171021.htm.  
59 WTO, Work Program on Electronic Commerce: Non-paper from the United States, JOB/GC/94, 4 July 2016, at 
para. 1.2.  
60 Id., at para. 1.3.   
61 Id., at para. 2.1-2.16.   
62 Id., at para. 2.1.   
63 Id., at para. 2.2.   
64 Id., at para. 2.3.   
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technology66 or source code.67 In addition to reducing government regulation, the US proposal 
also calls for more autonomy to e-commerce firms, which should have the freedom to use the 
technology,68 authentication methods,69 encryption methods,70 and facilities and services71 of 
their own choice. Such freedom of choice applies not only to existing technologies and products, 
but also to “new and innovative digital products and services”.72 The role of the government, 
according to the US proposal, is to facilitate the development of e-commerce by pushing for 
regulatory coherence at the global level, which can be achieved through adopting faster, more 
transparent customs procedures,73 promoting the mutual recognition of standards and conformity 
assessment procedures,74 and the development of market-driven regulations and standards which 
are characterized by significant stakeholder participation75 and global interoperability.76   
 
III. The Chinese Approach 
 
Compared to the US, China has taken a much more cautious approach to e-commerce 
issues in trade agreements until very recently. Its positions on e-commerce are mainly reflected 
in three forums, i.e, the EWTP, FTA & WTO.    
 
A. EWTO & EWTP 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
65 Id., at para. 2.5.   
66 Id., at para. 2.6.   
67 Id., at para. 2.7.   
68 Id., at para. 2.8.   
69 Id., at para. 2.9.  
70 Id., at para. 2.11.   
71 Id., at para. 2.10.  
72 Id., at para. 2.12.   
73 Id., at para. 2.14.   
74 Id., at para. 2.16.  
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At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in Jan 2015, Jack Ma, the founder 
of Alibaba, first raised the idea for an “e-WTO”.77 According to Ma, while the WTO has been 
great in the past century, its beneficiaries are mainly the big companies which trade across the 
globe. “Today, the Internet can help small businesses sell things cross the oceans”, thus, Ma 
suggested that Alibaba can build up “a platform for global small business”, what he called the 
“e-WTO”.78 At the Summer Davos Forum in September79 and the APEC CEO summit in 
November80 of the same year, Ma reiterated his calls for the e-WTO again. 
 
In Feb 2016, Ma changed the name of his proposal from the “e-WTO” to “e-WTP”，or 
“Electronic World Trade Platform”, to emphasize that his objective is building a platform rather 
than organization.81 At the Boao forum in March 2016, Ma called for the establishment of the 
e-WTP.82 He emphasized that such platform “is not an organization”, instead, it is a platform for 
the internet age that is “more open, fairer and freer”, a platform “to enable the small and medium 
enterprises and the consumers of the world, especially the young”. In the B20 2016 Policy 
Recommendations to the G20, the Business 20 group also adopted the eWTP as one of the its 
key recommendations by calling the G20 to “endorse the concept of the Electronic World Trade 
Platform (eWTP) - an all stakeholder initiative led by the private sector - as a vehicle for public 
private dialogue that can incubate the rules to foster the right policy and business environment 
for cross-border e-trade development”. 83  The proposal was also noted in the G20 Trade 
                                                          
77 James Quinn, ‘Alibaba can become bigger than Walmart, says founder’, in The Telegraph, 23 Jan 2015, available 
at 
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78 PYMNTS, ‘Jack Ma’s Global “2 Billion Consumer” Plan’, 26 January 2015, available at 
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79 Vivian Yang, ‘eWTO Needed to Govern the Internet, Says Jack Ma’, 9 September 2015, available at 
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80 See Tai Beiping, ‘Interview: "E-WTO" necessary in era of e-commerce: Jack Ma’, Xinhuanet, 18 November 2015, 
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/18/c_134830593.htm; Eileen Yu, ‘Jack Ma: Free trade a 
human right, small firms need more help’, in By The Way, 18 November 2015 available at 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/jack-ma-free-trade-a-human-right-small-firms-need-more-help/. 
81 ‘Special Interview with Ma Yun: 2016, Don’t forget Yours Roots, Don’t Fear the Future [Zhuanfang Ma Yun: 
2016 Buwang Chuxin, Buwei Jianglai]’, in Qianjiang Evening News (Qianjiang Wanbao), 5 February 2016, 
available at http://biz.zjol.com.cn/system/2016/02/05/021015532_01.shtml. 
82 ‘Alibaba's Jack Ma proposes new global e-commerce platform’, in Xinhua, 24 March 2016, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/boaoforumforasia/2016-03/24/content_24065122.htm. 
83 B20, ‘Towards an Innovative, Invigorated, Interconnected & Inclusive World Economy: B20 2016 Policy 
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Ministers Meeting Statement84 and the G20's Leaders' Communique Hangzhou Summit.85  
 
According to Alibaba, eWTP is a platform to collectively forge rules governing 
e-commerce, exchange best practices, build future facilities and achieve inclusive trade.86 There 
will be three components of the eWTP ecosystem. First, at the rules level, it will provide the 
platform for stakeholders to discuss and incubate new rules and standards for the digital age, 
especially those directly related to e-commerce such as digital border, tariff policy, data flow, 
credit system and consumer protection. 87  Second, at the commercial level, there will be 
commercial exchanges and cooperations among the stakeholders to build the new infrastructure 
for the internet age, such as e-commerce platform, finance and payment, logistics and storage, 
trade-related services, marketing and education and training.88 Third, at the technological level, 
the eWTP aims to build a technological framework based on the internet, big data and cloud 
computing, internet of things, and artificial intelligence. 89  The three components are 
interconnected and inter-dependent, where the discussions on rules will be based on the practices 
at the commercial and technological levels, while the new rules resulting from such discussions 
can in turn promote the commercial cooperations and new technological innovations.90  
 
The key features of the eWTP are:91  
1. Market-driven and led by the private sector; 
2. Open and transparent, with equal participation from all stakeholders including 
government agencies, businesses, international organizations, think-tanks, scholars and various 
communities; 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Recommendations to the G20’, 10 August 2016, at p. 14., available at http://en.b20-china.org/documents/doc/1/2. 
84 G20 Trade Ministers Meeting Statement, 9-10 July 2016, Shanghai, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/dgra_09jul16_e.pdf. 
85 G20 Leaders' Communique Hangzhou Summit, 4-5 September 2016, available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1395000.shtml. 
86 Ali Research, ‘EWTP 2017 Annual Report [Shijie Dianzi Maoyi Pingtai Changyi (eWTP) 2017 Niandu Baogao]’, 
at p. 3, available at i.aliresearch.com/img/20170323/20170323182812.pdf.  
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3. More attention to the demands of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs), 
consumers and developing countries; 
4. Rapid incubation, dissemination and development of new models, rules and standards 
for e-commerce service and regulations through the “market-driven, pilot-implementation” 
approach.  
 
In the long term, the eWTP hopes to achieve four objectives: development of the SMMEs; 
growth of inclusive trade; globalization of consumption, and development of the young people.92  
 
While the details of the eWTP still remain a work in progress, Ma has suggested rules 
such as tariff exemption for SMMEs with less than one million USD of annual exports, 24-hour 
customs clearance, expedition of customs procedures and logistics.93 In other words, the focus 
will be mainly on the traditional tariff reduction and trade facilitation issues. In terms of the 
negotiating approach, Ma prefers to work out the rules on a country by country basis rather than 
going through the multilateral negotiation process in the WTO.94 After visiting dozens of 
countries, Ma announced that the first overseas e-hub for the eWTP will be hosted in Malaysia.95 
In November 2017, the hub, also known as the Digital Free Trade Zone, officially went alive.96 
In Dec 2017, the eWTP launched the “Enabling E-commerce” initiative along with the WTO and 
the World Economic Forum.97  
 
B. FTA 
 
Unlike the aggressive approach of the US in its FTAs, China has taken a rather cautious 
approach on non-traditional trade issues such as e-commerce. The first Chinese FTA to address 
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e-commerce is the one with New Zealand (2008), but it was only mentioned incidentally in the 
chapter on technical barriers to trade (TBT) and the annexed agreement on conformity 
assessments. Since then, it has included e-commerce chapters only in two FTAs, i.e., the ones 
with Korea and Australia, both of which went into effect on Dec 30, 2015. 
 
Between the two, the Korea FTA is rather modest. It includes nine articles which cover 
the following: 98  moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmission; electronic 
authentication and electronic signature; protection of personal information in e-commerce; 
paperless trading; cooperation; and non-application of the dispute settlement chapter. Many of 
these provisions build upon the existing obligations under the other international agreements and 
do not add new substantive obligations. For example, the provisions on moratorium on customs 
duties and paperless trading are based on the WTO obligations. Another problem is that some of 
these obligations are couched in soft non-binding language. For example, the article on paperless 
trading simply requires parties to “endeavour to make trade administration documents available 
to the public in electronic form” and “explore the possibility of accepting trade administration 
documents submitted electronically as the legal equivalent of the paper version of those 
documents”.99 Moreover, even for the clauses with stronger languages, there is no uniform 
approach mandated and the Parties instead are given wide discretion in adopting their own 
versions of domestic regulatory framework. These include, for example, the clauses on electronic 
authentication and electronic signature, and protection of personal information. Finally, the 
utility of the obligations in the chapter is further weakened by two provisions. One is Art. 13.2, 
which provides that, in the event of any inconsistency between the e-commerce Chapter and 
other FTA Chapters, the other Chapters shall prevail. The other is the final provision, which 
provides that the chapter on dispute settlement does not apply to the e-commerce Chapter.100 
This means that, even the binding obligations in the chapter do not have real possibility of being 
enforced.  
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In contrast, the Australia FTA goes further by adding the following provisions.101 First is 
the provision on transparency, which requires the Parties to promptly publish or make publicly 
available all e-commerce related measures of general application and respond promptly to all 
requests by the other Party for specific information on such measures.102 Second, Art. 12.5 
requires the Parties to maintain domestic legal frameworks governing electronic transactions 
based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996. Third, under Art. 12.7, the 
Parties are required to “provide protection for consumers using electronic commerce that is at 
least equivalent to that provided for consumers of other forms of commerce”.  
 
Another improvement of the Australia FTA over the Korea one is the strengthening of 
obligations. For example, while Art. 13.6 of the Korea FTA only directs the Parties to “explore 
the possibility of accepting trade administration documents submitted electronically as the legal 
equivalent of the paper version of those documents”, the Australia FTA turns this into a binding 
obligation by mandating the acceptance of electronic versions of such documents.103 However, 
this provision is followed by an exception clause in the same provision, which allows the Parties 
to refuse to recognize electronic documents as paper documents when “there is a domestic or 
international legal requirement to the contrary”.104 This not only weakens the binding force of 
the obligation, but could potentially violate the obligation to accept electronic copies under 
Article 10.2 of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.  
 
The Australia FTA also removes the Korea FTA provision on deference to the other 
chapters in case of inconsistency. Instead, parity of e-commerce with traditional modes of trade 
is achieved through Art. 12.1.3, which calls the Parties to “endeavour to ensure that bilateral 
trade through electronic commerce is no more restricted than other forms of trade”. 
Notwithstanding all the progress made, their practical utilities are still limited as the FTA also 
excludes the e-commerce chapter from the application of the dispute settlement chapter.   
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C. WTO 
 
China’s cautious approach on e-commerce in FTAs is reflected in its position in the WTO, 
where it has also been rather reluctant to engage in the issue until very recently.  
 
China’s first encounter with e-commerce in the WTO setting took place in the 
China-Publications case, where the US argued that China’s commitments on "sound recording 
distribution services" covers "electronic distribution of sound recordings".105 China disagreed 
with the US approach and argued instead that such electronic distribution “in fact corresponds to 
network music services”,106 which only emerged in 2001 and are totally different in kind from 
the "sound recording distribution services". According to China, the most fundamental difference 
between the two is that, unlike "traditional" sound recording distribution services, network music 
services “do not supply the users with sound recordings in physical form, but supply them with 
the right to use a musical content”.107 In response, the US cited the panel’s statement in US – 
Gambling that "the GATS does not limit the various technologically possible means of delivery 
under mode 1", as well as the principle of "technological neutrality" mentioned in the Work 
Programme on Electronic Commerce – Progress Report to the General Council, and argued that 
electronic distribution is merely a means of delivery rather than a new type of services.108 
Furthermore, the US argued that the term "distribution" encompasses not only the distribution of 
goods, but also distribution of services.109 After a lengthy discussion covering the ordinary 
meaning, the context, the provisions of the GATS, the object and purpose and various 
supplementary means of interpretation, the Panel concluded that the term "sound recording 
distribution services" does extend to distribution of sound recording through electronic means.110 
China appealed the Panel’s findings, but they were upheld by the Appellate Body, which largely 
adopted the Panel’s reasoning.111 
                                                          
105 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS363/AB/R, DSR 2010:II, 261, at paras. 4.49-4.71.  
106 Id., at para. 4.147.  
107 Id., at para. 4.149. 
108 Id., at para. 4.69. 
109 Id., at para. 7.1156. 
110 Id., at para. 7.1168-1265. 
111 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
CN-US-EC 
22 
 
With such unpleasant experience, it is no wonder that China has not been very 
enthusiastic about the discussion of e-commerce in the WTO. However, with the rapid 
development of e-commerce, China gradually realized that it has a competitive edge on 
e-commerce and should promote its development. In 2013, China’s e-commerce transaction 
value exceeded 10 trillion Renminbin, and it surpassed the US to become the largest e-commerce 
market in the world.112 Encouraged by the development, the Chinese government decided to 
further unleash the enormous potential of e-commerce by designating Hangzhou, where Alibaba 
is based, as the first Cross-Border E-commerce Comprehensive Pilot Area.113 At the World 
Internet Conference held in Wuzhen in Dec 2015, President Xi Jinping stated that China is 
willing to enhance cooperation with all countries to promote the development of world 
investment and trade through the development of cross-border e-commerce and establishing 
information economy pilot areas. 114  In Jan 2016, the State Council further expands the 
Cross-Border E-commerce Comprehensive Pilot Areas to 12 cities.115  
 
The rapid development of e-commerce in China also helped to boost its confidence in 
e-commerce rule-making. On Oct. 9, 2016, the CCP Politburo held the 36th Collective Study 
Session with “Implementation of the Internet Power Strategy” as the topic.116 In his speech at 
the Session, President Xi emphasized that China shall not only use the digital economy to 
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promote economic development, but also further enhance its power to set the agenda and make 
rules for cyberspace at the international stage.117  Perhaps in response to such high-level 
exhortation, China made its first submission on e-commerce at the WTO in November 2016.118  
 
At the outset, China proposed that the scope of e-commerce discussions should “focus on 
promotion and facilitation of cross-border trade in goods enabled by internet, together with 
services directly supporting such trade in goods, such as payment and logistics services.”119 This 
reflects China’s reservation on the discussion of pure digital services, as revealed in the 
China-Publications case.  
 
Furthermore, even for trade in goods, China took a cautious approach with two 
limitations. First, China proposes that the e-commerce discussions are “to clarify and to improve 
the application of existing multilateral trading rules”.120 This suggests that China is not eager to 
discuss new rules such as those on freedom of information flow, data localization, etc. Second, 
the proposal also states that discussions at this stage “should not lead to new market access 
commitments including tariff reductions”.121 This means that tariff negotiations will not be part 
of the discussions on e-commerce.   
 
As there is no room for either new rules or new tariff concessions, all that remain to 
negotiate are just trade facilitation and transparency rules, which are exactly what the Chinese 
submission covers. There are five sections in the proposal, but the main proposals are found in 
the first section, which addresses the following issues:122 
1. Simplified border measures for certain products under B2B (business to business) and 
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B2C (business to consumer) mode, such as VAT (Value Added Tax) rebates, simplified 
fast-track procedures for customs clearance, better policies for returned goods, allowing 
establishment of bonded warehouse in the export destinations with simplified customs 
procedures and duty concessions.  
2. Exchange information on regulatory requirements to facilitate the establishment of 
platforms for cross-border E-Commerce transactions such as eWTP, which is also prominently 
featured in the proposal. 
3. Promote paperless trade, and facilitate the data exchange between the single window of 
a WTO Member and cross-border E-Commerce transaction platforms, traders, and supporting 
services providers of trade facilitation, payment, logistics and courier services, as well as the data 
exchange among different Member’s single windows. 
4. Exchange information on regulatory framework governing e-commerce supporting 
services, such as trade financing, electronic and online payment, logistics and courier, online 
customs clearance and other trade facilitation services, and bolster cooperation among the 
service suppliers.  
 
Section 2 calls for enhanced transparency on the policy framework on cross-border 
e-commerce through the publication of relevant regulatory measures and making such 
information available to firms and other Members.123 Section 3 suggests Members to exchange 
information on policies on digital certificates, electronic signature and electronic authentication, 
and promote their mutual recognitions.124 Section 4 addresses the policies on other relevant 
issues such as consumer protection, privacy protection and intellectual property rights.125 The 
final Section calls for intensified discussion among the various WTO Councils and incorporation 
of e-commerce issues in the works by the WTO Secretariat, such as more research and training 
on e-commerce issues.126 
 
IV. Comparison of the Two Approaches 
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As the discussions above have illustrated, the US and China have taken quite different 
approaches to digital trade issues in trade agreements. This section discusses the major 
differences and explores the underlying reasons. 
 
A. Digital or Trade?  
 
Overall, the differences between the US and China are reflected in their chosen 
terminology, where one refers to them as “digital trade” while the other prefers to call them 
“electronic commerce”. More specifically, the differences between the two include the 
following: 
 
1. Scope of coverage 
 
The US proposals focus on the digital contents or services, and largely ignores the trade 
in goods issue. This is reflected in the US FTAs, which defines “digital products” to include 
“computer programme, text, video, image, sound recording or other product that is digitally 
encoded, produced for commercial sale or distribution, and that can be transmitted 
electronically”.127 Moreover, the US chose to deliberately leave open the issue of whether trade 
in digital products through electronic transmission should be categorized as trade in services or 
trade in goods.128 Such “constructive ambiguity” avoids the hard battle that is often fought on 
services liberalization and make it easier to address all digital trade issues under a single 
framework rather than being divided into different rules for goods versus services. In contrast, 
the Chinese proposals mainly deal with trade in goods. Even where services are mentioned, they 
are mainly ancillary services helping to facilitate goods trade.129 Such an approach is not 
surprising, as China has long taken a cautious approach on services liberalization, and most of its 
commitments are in mode 3 rather than mode 1.    
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2. Type of trade barrier 
 
The US proposals tend to go deep into the behind-the-border trade barriers, which include 
not only discriminations against or among digital products in general, but also specific types of 
trade barriers such as restrictions on cross-border data flow, data localization requirements, 
forced transfer of technology or source code, etc. On the other hand, China is concerned mostly 
with traditional border barriers such as high tariffs, cumbersome customs procedure, etc.  
 
3. Regulatory approach 
 
Many of the US proposals call for deregulation or removal of regulations on the location 
of computer facilities, transfer of technology, disclosure of source code or propriety data. Instead 
of relying on government regulation, the US favours self-regulation by the industry and argues 
that the firms should be able to choose their own technology, network, authentication methods 
and encryption products. Even for technical standards which normally are set by the government, 
the US prefers a market-driven approach with significant involvement by firms in their 
development. China, however, prefers to deal with e-commerce related issues on a 
government-to-government basis. Even for initiatives which were originally started by private 
firms, such as the eWTP, China still prefers it to be handled through the governments rather than 
going directly to firms.  
 
4. Relationship with WTO rules 
 
Many of the issues on the US shopping list have not been mentioned in the existing WTO 
rules, which were really designed to deal with traditional trade in goods issues and thus 
ill-equipped to handle the digital trade barriers such as data flow restrictions, localization 
requirements and forced transfer of source codes. Thus, many of the digital trade rules proposed 
by the US really go beyond the narrow confines of the WTO regulatory framework. To address 
these issues, the WTO needs to realign its regulatory philosophy and redesign its outdated 
toolbox, which so far has largely been focusing on trade in tangible goods and border measures. 
The Chinese proposals, however, do not really go that far from the existing WTO rules. Instead, 
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as China itself has stated, they simply “clarify and to improve the application of existing 
multilateral trading rules” without adding much new.130 Indeed, even if no new negotiations are 
conducted, the measures covered by the Chinese proposals could still be addressed within the 
existing WTO rules. 
 
B. Reasons for the Differences 
 
Trade rules never exist in a vacuum. Instead, they often reflect the unique trade profiles 
of the countries proposing such rules and their own domestic regulatory frameworks.131 These 
are also the reasons for the different approaches to e-commerce taken by the US and China.  
 
1. Nature of the trade 
 
Among the top ten internet companies in the world, six are US companies such as 
Amazon, Alphabet (Google), Facebook, Priceline, Ebay, Netflix, while the remaining four are 
Chinese companies including JD.com, Tencent, Alibaba, Baidu.132 The US companies are 
mostly service providers which provide online search, social network or content services. In 
contrast, two of the top three Chinese companies sell mainly physical goods. This explains why 
the US focuses on digital services while China focuses on traditional trade in goods enabled by 
the internet. 
 
The other two Chinese companies on the list, i.e., Tencent and Baidu provide respectively 
social networking and search services. While they are often referred to respectively as the 
Facebook and the Google in China, they do not share the demands by the latter group for rules 
on cross-border digital trade because they are not global companies like their US counterparts. 
Instead, they serve the Chinese market almost exclusively and most of their facilities and 
operations are based in China. In contrast, while the main facilities of the US companies like 
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Google and Facebook are often based in the US, they also have data centres at strategic locations 
around the world.133 Thus, for them, it is crucial to have free flow of information across the 
globe and autonomy in deciding where to locate their computing facilities and servers. 
 
2. Domestic regulatory framework 
 
In the history of the multilateral trading system, it is not unusual for countries to 
transplant rules from their domestic regulatory framework into the international trade agreements. 
For example, the transparency obligation under the GATT was copied from the US 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).134 Similarly, it is well known that the GATT and WTO 
anti-dumping regime is modelled after Canadian and American statutes.135 This is also the case 
with regard to e-commerce proposals from US and China. 
 
In the US, the development of the internet companies benefited greatly from the lax 
regulatory environment. Such “permissive legal framework”, as argued by Anupam Chander, 
“offers the United States as a sort of export-processing zone in which Internet entrepreneurs can 
experiment and establish services.”136 According to Chander, the groundwork for dominance of 
US internet companies is laid by the following laws: free speech rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which 
immunizes interactive computer services providers from legal claims arising from third-party 
speech published on their networks; copyright infringement liability protections under the safe 
harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act; and “weak consumer privacy 
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regulations”. 137  The aim of reducing regulation in the sector is even codified in the 
Telecommunication Act of 1996, which explicitly state that it is “the policy of the United 
States … to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet 
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation”.138 These 
laws minimized the risks for internet companies and allowed them to grow at exponential speed. 
Thus, it is no surprise that the US wishes to call for deregulation at the international level.  
 
On the other hand, the development of the internet in China has always been subject to 
heavy government regulation. There are mainly two types of regulations. The first regulates the 
hardware or the facilities. Barely two years after the internet was introduced into China, the 
Chinese government issued the Provisional Regulations on the Management of International 
Networking of Computer Information Networks139 to regulate the development of the sector. 
According to the regulation, connection to international networks must go through international 
gateway provided by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and firms and individuals 
are prohibited from establishing or using any other gateways. 140  A high level Economic 
Information Group is established under the State Council to regulate the sector141 and all new 
Internet networks must be approved by the State Council.142 Anyone caught accessing the 
internet through illegal channels could be fined up to 15,000 RMB,143 which was a hefty amount 
at the time.  
 
The second type of regulations focus on the content. In 2000, the State Council issued the 
Regulation on Internet Information Service. 144  The Regulation prohibits a wide range of 
contents, such as information endangering national security, leaking state secrets, harming state 
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honour and interests, spreading rumours, disrupting social order and stability.145 As the items on 
the list are vaguely worded and often broadly interpreted, the Regulation operates like a sword of 
Damocles hanging over the heads of the internet users. Moreover, unlike the US, internet 
information service providers are not exonerated from liabilities arising from user-generated 
contents in China. Instead, they are not only required by the Regulation to ensure that the 
contents they themselves provide are legal,146 but also shall not copy, publish or distribute any 
illegal information produced by their users or anyone else. 147  Once they discover such 
information being transmitted on their website, they shall “terminate the transmission 
immediately and keep record and report to relevant authorities.148” If they fail to comply with 
these requirements, they could have their business licenses revoked, websites shutdown or even 
be subject to criminal liabilities.149  
 
With such tight restrictions, it is no surprise that few content providers from China could 
become real global players. As mentioned earlier, even though companies such as Tencent and 
Baidu are among the largest internet companies in the world, they primary service the Chinese 
market and lack global presence. On the other hand, such constraints can be a blessing for the 
Chinese companies as well. As the foreign companies wishing to enter the Chinese market are 
subject to the same restrictions, they find it particularly hard to adjust their business models 
developed in an open and free internet to fit the constricting regulatory environment in China. 
Thus, paradoxically, the internet restrictions in China also helped to shield firms like Baidu and 
Tencent from the competitions by Google and Facebook and effectively reserved the Chinese 
market to these home-grown firms, which quickly became the largest internet companies in the 
world by drawing from the enormous demands in the Chinese market alone.  
 
Moreover, with the heavy regulation in China, the internet companies realized that, if 
they were to achieve commercial success in China, they should align their commercial strategy 
with the government agenda, or, better yet, make it part of the government policy. For example, 
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in 2015, the “internet+” model proposed by Tencent CEO Pony Ma was Incorporated into the 
official government Work Report of the State Council as the “Internet+ Action Plan”.150 The 
other example is the eWTP initiative, which was not only taken up by the Chinese government, 
but also elevated to the international level by making its way into the G20 Communique and 
China’s official e-commerce proposal in the WTO. Thus, it is no surprise that China prefer to 
deal with e-commerce issues through the government, as that has been how the sector was 
developed in China. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
The rapid growth of e-commerce in the past two decades have created many challenges 
for the international trading system. In particular, the regulatory framework of the WTO, which 
was originally designed for the traditional offline trade model, has to grapple with issues such as 
the classification of e-commerce, application of existing trade rules to the sector, and how to 
design new rules that better reflect the realities of online trade. Due to the divergence of views 
among the WTO membership, efforts to revamp the rules in the WTO have largely failed. 
Disappointed over the lack of progress in the WTO, the US, as the champion of digital trade, had 
turned to various bilateral, plurilateral and regional initiatives to push for the internationalization 
of digital trade rules which are based on the regulatory philosophy and approach in the US to 
tackle trade barriers facing US companies. Meanwhile, while initially reluctant to engage on the 
issue at the international level, China has also gradually warmed up to the issue and became 
more willing in negotiating e-commerce rules in its recent FTAs. Ahead of the Ministerial 
Conference in Buenos Aries, both the US and China have also submitted negotiating proposals 
on the issue in the WTO. 
 
While both submissions are couched in exploratory language and neither claims to be a 
formal negotiating proposal, they are still useful as they tell us the major differences between the 
two. Overall, the US approach tends to focus more on the “digital” nature of digital trade, while 
the Chinese approach prefers to address the issue from the traditional “trade” perspective. Thus, 
                                                          
150 Xinhua, ‘When China's tech “big four” meet “Internet Plus”, 9 March 2015, available at 
http://china.org.cn/business/2015-03/09/content_35031639.htm.  
CN-US-EC 
32 
the US submission focuses on the behind-the-border barriers, especially those relating to various 
services provided online by internet companies. In contrast, China is more concerned with the 
customs and border issues, especially those relating to the facilitation of trade in goods bought 
via online platforms yet delivered in physical forms offline. Such differences are not really 
surprising, as they reveal the deep gap between the two: while the US internet companies have 
successfully moved their businesses entirely online by turning their commodity from tangible 
products to information or bits, Chinese companies still continue to trade physical goods or 
atoms, as mankind has done for centuries.  
 
Which of the two approaches will win the support from other WTO Members? It might 
be natural to assume that the US approach is more appealing to developed country Members, 
which also share the comparative advantages in services trade, while the Chinese approach is 
more receptive to developing country Members, which mostly rely heavily on goods trade. 
However, such simplified view tells only part of the story. There are divergent views even within 
each camp. For developed countries, while they share the vision of the US in further promoting 
trade in services and knowledge, they might still fear the encroachment of American websites on 
their national culture at the same time. Moreover, as the negotiations in the TPP, TISA and TTIP 
have illustrated, the other developed countries demand higher levels of privacy and personal 
information protection than the US and try to reign in the abuse of market power by the 
American internet giants.151 On the other hand, the Chinese call to build an online trade platform 
will probably find warm reception among developing countries, as such platform will benefit 
MSMEs, which account for most of the growth and jobs in many developing countries. 
Nonetheless, some developing countries might still be reluctant as they lack the financial 
resources to build such platform, or to invest in the hardwares and softwares necessary to 
facilitate cross-border e-commerce. Even if China offers to provide the necessary financing for 
such projects, some developing countries might still be hesitant to commit as they might view 
this as a Trojan horse to sell more products to them by China, the largest producer and exporter 
of manufactured goods in the world.  
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Notwithstanding so many difficulties, I think it is still imperative for the WTO to start 
substantive work on e-commerce and digital trade, lest the WTO became irrelevant in this 
important sector with growing significance and immense potential. To move forward on the issue, 
the Members can start with uncontroversial issues with sufficient consensus among the 
membership, such as making permanent the moratorium on customs duties on e-commerce. As 
to the more controversial issues, the Members might wish to consider a positive-listing approach 
as under the GATS, or a system of tiered obligations for different categories of Members as 
under the Trade Facilitation Agreement. Hopefully, the Members can realize the significance of 
bringing e-commerce and digital trade within the framework of the multilateral trading system 
and seize the opportunity by building on the momentum of the Ministerial Decision and Joint 
Ministerial Declaration made at the Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires.   
